Grand foreign-policy strategies rarely disappear overnight. More often, they are dismantled gradually through subtle rhetorical shifts, bureaucratic adjustments and changing diplomatic priorities. America¡¯s Indo-Pacific strategy is no exception.
A decade ago, then-Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe unveiled the concept of a ¡°free and open¡± Indo-Pacific. Based on the idea that the Indian and Pacific Oceans form a single strategic theater, he sought to build a coalition of democracies committed to preventing any one power from dominating the region.
The United States subsequently embraced this vision, reviving the ¡°Quad¡± coalition and establishing its members ¡ª Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. ¡ª as the principal anchors of the regional balance of power. The underlying strategic logic was compelling. Like the alliance system more broadly, the Indo-Pacific coalition would amplify U.S. influence by encouraging middle powers to shoulder greater responsibility for regional stability. Moreover, its multiple centers of power and shared objective would make it inherently resilient.
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